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damaged if  you, who have hitherto been the 
great leaders, suddenly become silent? You 
surely do not care for the opinion of  the stu-
pkl!  But sensible  people  will  ollly think 
all the more afyon. 
'l'lnul it is stated that Professor .Tacob at 
Balle  has  utterly  abandoned  speculative 
philosophy, and devoted himself altogether 
t.o  political  economy,  a  branch of science 
wherein  ruany  excellent attaimnentsmay 
be expected from bis praisewol'thy accnracy 
and ill dustry.  He has shown himself n ,vise 
mall by ccasillg to he a l}hilosopher;  and I 
herewith  publicly  express  my esteem for 
him 011  that aecotlut, aud hope that every 
scnsible luan  who knows whut speeulatiou 
is will share this esteem. 'Voulll that aU the 
others WOllid  alflo  aballllon a scieJl(;e  which' 
they have  u.lJlludalltly  tortured themselves 
to gmsp, :wd fbr which they have discoyered 
that they are not made.  I"e[;  them tnrn to 
some  other  uscful  occnpation-grinding 
glnsse;;, HUlking" verses, writillg  lIovels, and 
stmlyiup; ::tgrieuItul'e  or game-keeping; let 
them  take  sen'ice  in the detective police, 
study nJ(',lit"ine,  raiF!e  cattle, or write devo-
ti011111  l'etleetiolls 011 death for every day ill 
the year,-:md no OIle will refnse  them his 
esteelll. 
But since, nevertheless, T  cannot be sure 
that they and the like ofthein will follow 
good advice,  I  adc1the follo"wing  in order 
"that they can not IJlead that I  did ilOt tell 
them what would happen: 
'!'his is the tbu'd time that I  make a report 
concerning: the  natute  of  the  Science  of 
Knowledge.  I  should not like to  be com-
pelled to do so a fourth time, and I  am tired 
ofseeil1g my words passing from mouth to 
"mouth disfigured ill such a. terriblc manner 
ti13.t  I  scarcely  recognize them.  Hence I 
shall presllppose that many of our modern 
literary men ij,nd philosophers will not even 
understand this third report.  I  ahlO presup-
pose, because I  know it,  that absolutely ey-
er.r lnun can know whether he does or does 
not understand something, and that no one 
is forced to speak of  It matter he is conscions 
of  not  understanding.  Henee  I  shall 110 
1110re leave this work to its fate than all my 
"fntnre  scientific  vmrks,  but  shall  strictly 
watch over the expressions  it may  excite, 
and cOlnment upon them in a  periodical.  If 
it does not reform  tbese gossips, it may at 
least teach the public  "what  sort of people 
have undertaken, ll.nd  still undertake, to di-
rect its opinion. 
Ilcrlin, 1801. 
SO~ME CONSEQUENCES OF FOUR INCAPACITIES. 
[By C. s.  PEIRCE.] 
DcsearteR ifl the father of modern philoso-
phy,  mHl  the spirit of CarteRi:mi;;:m-that 
which prindpally distinguishes it from  the 
sellOlasUdsm  ,\'hiclh  it;  tlispItlccd -lllay be 
COlllpCtH.1ionsly stated as follows: 
1. It  te:tehCfl that philosophy must begin 
with univer,ml doubt; whereas scholasticism 
h:ulllever (lnestiollecl fundamcntals. 
2. It  teaches that the ultimate test of cer-
taillt.y  is to he found in the individual COI1-
sciousness;  whereas scholasticism had restr 
eel  on  the  testimony of sages and  of the 
Cntholic Church. 
3.  'l'he multiform. argumentation of the 
middle ages is replaced by asil1gle thread of 
illfcl'cnee llepelldIJlg often npOll iUCOllSpicll-
ons pl·clni;;:cs. 
.1.  Scholastidsm Imd its mysteries of  tltith, 
but Hlttlel·took to explain all creat-etl thilws. 
But there arc luany  facts ""hich  Um·tesiani~ll 
lIot only does Hot explain,  but renders ab-
solutely inexplicable,  unless  to  say  that 
" God HlHkes them so" is to he regarded as 
an explanation. 
In some,  or all  of those  respects,  Inost 
lTlmlern philosophers  have  beel!, in ellect, 
Cartcsians.  Now without wishing to return 
to scholasticism, it seems to Inc that mod-
ern scienee uncI modern logie reqnire llS to 
stand upon  a  very difl:'erellt  plattbrm from 
tllis. 
1.  vVo canllot begin with eornplete doubt. 
We lllust bcgin with all the prejudices which 
we ltetually have when we entet upon the 
study of philosophy.  '.l'hese prejudices are 
not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they ure 
thingfl whieh it docs not occur to us can be 
questioned.  lIence  thl,c;  initial  sceptiCism 
will he  a mere self-deception, aud not real 
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sian 111Ctliotl will ever be satisfied until he 
1ms  formanv  l'ccoveretl  all  those  hcJief.'l 
"which in form he has given up.  It  is, there-
1'ore, as nseless a IJreliIniuarv as 'Yoiulr to the  .J  0  e:> 
N ol'tIl 1>ole would be in order to get to Con-
stantinople by cOIning down regularly npon 
a  rneridian.  A  person Ilmy, itis true, in the 
COl.U·se  of his  stmlies, tlllll reason to doubt 
. "what he begfUl by believing; but in that ease 
he doubts because he has !l. positive reason 
for it, and not on account of the Cartesian 
l11::r:".'1I1\.  Let us not pretend to doubt in phi-
losophy ,vhat we do not donbt in our hellrts. 
2.  'rhe  same  formalisut  appears  in the 
CarteBian critet'ioH, which atnounls to this: 
"vVhatever I  am  clel1rly  convinced  of,  is 
truc."  If  I were l'eally convinced, I  should 
have done with reasoning,  and should 1'C-
(l'Ll1re  no test  of  certainty.  But  thus  to 
llla1>;:c single indivilluals absolute judges of 
trutll is most perniciOUS.  'rhe result is that 
lnetapllysiciaus  "will  all  agree that met.a-
physics has re:<clled ,t pitch of certainty far 
heyond that of the physical sciences;-only 
they call agree upon nothing else.  In sci-
ences in  which nwn  COllle  to  agreement, 
"when n.  theory has been broached, it is con-
sidered to be on probatioll llntil this agree-
lllcnt is reached.  ~1-fter it is reache(l, the 
qnestion of cedainty becomes an idle one, 
"because there is 110 one left '.'1110  doubts it. 
"<Va  individually  canoot  reasonably  hope 
to attain t1le ultimate philosophy which we 
llnrsne ;we can  only seek it, therefore,  for 
the comnmnity of philosophers.  Hence, if 
(lisciplined and eanilid minels carefully ex-
anline a theory ancll'cfuse to accept it, this 
ou<rht to create donbts in the mind of the  = 
author of the theory hhnself. 
3. Philosophy ought to imitate the suc-
cessful sCiences in its lnethods, so  far as to 
proceed only fronl trmgible premises which 
can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and to 
trust rather; to the nUlltitude and variety of 
its arglllnents than to-the conclusiveness of 
anyone.  Its reasoning should not fornl a 
chain "which is no stronger than its weakest 
linl<, but a  cable whose fibres may be ever 
so  sleneler, provilled  they  are  snfficiently 
IHunerous and intimately connected. 
4. Every uniclealistic philosophy snpposes 
so:rne absolntely ineXl)licable. lmanalyzable 
ultbnate; in short, sometl1ing resulting  [1'0111 
n~ediation  itself not  :mseeptible of  mediation. 
N o,v that anything is thus inexplicable can 
only be known  by reasoning  fron~ signs. 
But the only jllstificatiOJl of  an inferellCo. 
front sign;;;  is  that thc  cflltc1l1sioll  expI:lilLs 
the fact.  'l'o snppnse the nwt ah.;oIHtel,- in-
explicable, is 1I0t;  to  explaiu it  <  11mI  h;me" 
this :;appositioll is nen,]" allowallle  . 
In the last lIumher of this jn1Il'llal  will 1\0' 
~ollnd It piece entHle(l  "Qne:"tioll'; eOllN'rll-
mg  certain  li'aeulties  d:iilll"ll  l'n';\("II." 
whieh  has  heen  written  ill  Ihi"  i'l>il'it  of 
oppositiou to Cartesi:mii'llt.  That ('j,1tieL"1Il 
of ~el'laill  facnlties ref'uItml ill timr denial". 
,vhwh  fbI'  convenience  1I1lty  here  he  re-
peatl:;d: 
1.  lVc have  no power  of  Intl'O."IH)(!tioll, 
but all knowleilge or the iuternal w'll'hl to;. 
deriYed hy hyputhetieal re:v;olliu,t; from our 
knowledge of external filetS. 
2.  lYe have llO powel' or Intuitioll. hut e\"-
e~T  eogniti::m is tletermillcd logically by rm.'-
VIOUS cogmtions. 
3.  'Ye have no power  ofthillldll'~ withont  .  ~  slgns. 
'1.  'Ve have no conception of the ah"-(.llltc-
Iy incognizahle,  . 
trhese llropo;:;itiolli; (,AUllJot lIe reg:tl'de.] as 
certnin;  Hnd, in order  to bring dwm to (l 
further test, it is II ow propo;;ctl to il'aee tlwnl 
ont to  their  eOIl~elluence;;.  'Ye lIlay  tir"t 
consider the first alone; then tmee the CUIl-
sequences of the fir5t alJ(I i'ct'nll<l:  thell  ~ce 
whatclse will result f,om  a~s\Unjng. the third 
also; and, 1illal1y, lulll  tho fom"th to our hy-
pothetical premise;;.  . 
In accepting the first propof'it.ioIl, wc nw"t 
put aside all prejlHliccs derivo(  I  f!'Om :1 phil-
osophy which  l:mses  our knowlellge of the 
external  \\'orlll  011  0111'  sclf-eonsci()uSlle~.~. 
'Ve can admit 110 statement concernillg ,\-!Hlt 
plLSi'eS within llS  exeept as a  hypothc"is lll)-
cessary to explain what takes place ill  ,.-hat 
we  commonly  C1111  the  externul  worM. 
:Moreover when we  IHLye UllOH sueh grouml;; 
assumed olle ihcllUy or mode of adient of the 
nliml, we cannot, of  course, adopt anyoUwi' 
hypothesis for tho purpooe of  explaining  aHY 
fact which elm hl] eXplainc(l by Ollr 111'31 :.<up-
position.  hut mUSE enrry the  latter  as far 
us  it will go.  In other worus,  Wt~ Juu,;t, 
ns fitr  as we  C~Jll  do 80 without additional 
hypothcs;cs, reduce  nIl  kinds of mental ac-
tion to one general type. 
'l'he cl:u's of mOlli1icatiullS  of cOllsdous-
ne;;;s with which we Illust COllll1lellCe om< in-
quiry must be one whose existence is i1Hlu-
bimble, and whose laws  are  best l'nown, 
and, therefore (since this knowledge COUles • 
C•  Uence8  Of' Four  IncopacitiP8.  Some  onseq  '.!  ' 
] '}  no"t cl ascI  v  fol-
frow  the out;;:ido),  w  no I,  t.  "-,  :t'j o·solne 
I f•  t  th'lt IS  It nlllS,  J  .,  If)w,.;exh'rna  acs;  ,<  "  tl  tl'  ,  '  ".  II  '0 In'LV 11VPO  1C,-
kill" of eogllitinll.  • erc"·  ':.'  f  the 




o  's  .,  , ,  r  o'  to  ,\"lnc 1  lore  1 
10)1"11101'  }lape.r, :wcor( w":.  ,  f  n  object 
no 'I tJ'<olut ely first cogUItIOn  a  11  y  , 
I,tt;  (";'  ell it  iOl\ Ul'i"cs by  a continuoW; profcoss. 
,.,  'tl  a ]J1'ocess 0  000'-
\\'(! 1l11lst lJegill, thCll, 'VI  l,  ' '.  '  "" 
.  ,  1  ,',  I  tlrlt  1)1'0£'058 whose laws are 
1I1t10ll. am  \\1  1  '  ,  ,..1 scI  follo;'vex-
hc:"t 11IItlCl'sto(){1 mal IllO"t co. y.  . 
1 "t"  '1"11'"  is nO other than tIle pI 0-
tpl"lltt  tae:-l.  f:j· 
, ,  't"  I' 11'111'('1'01100  which proceeds from, 
f'e~:-:-i  ()  ,a If.  - '..  Of  :  "  ,  •  to l't" conclusIOn, B, only I  ,  Its llreJlllSC, .... ,.- .  , 
t',ter'  (It' t'l"'~  "nell a l)rOposltlon as B  tl~ a  tlla  ..  '\...,-1I,  0-..-
is aIWll\"S or usually true when such a prop-
O"itiOll "as  .,A.  lS  tl'UC,  It is il consequence, 
tilfm. of the first two prinCiples wllOse  1'0-
>'tlttS' \\'(j are to truce out, that ,ve rnust, ::s 
l,t!'  u,;  we can,  \vithout any oUler SUPPOSI-
tion than that the mind  reasons,  red~tce all 
mental action  to the fOl'mnlil of Ylibel 1'oa.-
:;oning  .. 
But Iloes the mind in fact go through the 
,;yl1ogh;tic  process?  It  is  ~:ertail1ly  very 
doubtful  whether a  conelnSlOl1-as some-
thing existing in the Inind independently, 
like  ~U1 ilIlllgc-smll1enly displaces two prem-
i;:C8  exi~tiI;g in the mind in a similar. way. 
But it is a  nmtter of constant  expel'lenee, 
that if  a mllll is Inac1e to believe in the prem-
ises, in the sense that he will aet from tJwm 
awl will !'ay that they are true, under favoI'-
ahle conditions he will also be ready to act 
fWIIl the conelusioll and to say that that is 
true.  Something,  therefore,  takes  place 
within the organism which is e(luiyalent  t.o 
lite syllogistic process. 
A  Ylllid infercnee is either complete or in-
complete.  ..<\.u  incomplete  inference is one 
whose wllidity depends UPOll  some mutter 
of tiwt lIot contained in tho premises.  ~'his 
implied  fiwt  might have  been  stated as a 
premise, and its relati'll1 to the conclusiou l,s 
the >'arne whether it is explicitly posited or 
lIot,  since  it; is at least virtually taken for 
granted; , so that'  every valid ineomplete  U!'-
gmneut is  "irtl1ally  complete.  Complete 
arguments are divided jnto simple lemd  com-
IJlex.  A  eomlllex argUlllent is  one  which 
trom three or nlO1'O lll'elllises concludes what 
might huve  beeu  eoncluded  by successive 
;;teps in, reasonings each of which is simple. 
Thus,  a  conlplex inference  COIlles  to the 
same thing in the end as a succession of sim-
ple inferences. 
A  complete, Simple, and valid argument, 
or syllogislll, is either apodir:iic or Jl?'obabla, 
An apodictic or deductive  syllogism is one 
whose v:tlic1ity depends lI11concUi;iollnlly up-
011  the relation of the fact inferred to t:be 
fhets posited in the premises.  A ByUogism 
whose  validity should depend not  merely 
npon its premises, but UPOJl thc existence of 
smne other l{nowledge, wonld be impossi-
hIe; for either this other knowledge would 
be posited, in which case it would be a part 
of the  premises, or it would be impliCitly 
assumed, in 'wmch case the inference would, 
be  incomplete.  But a syllogism whose va-
lidity depends partly upon  the non-e.'t:istcn~e 
of some other knowledge, is It J)'f'obable 'Wl-
logism. 
,A few  examples will rCllder  this  plain. 
'1'be t.wo following argumcnts are apodictic 
or deductive: 
1. No series of days ofwhkh the first and 
last are different days of the week  exceeds 
by one a multiple Of;;e'l"Cll days; now thetirst 
and last days of allY leap-year are dHfercn't; 
days of  the week, and therefore no leap-year 
consists  of a  number, of days  one greater 
Until It l11u1tilJle of  seven. 
2,  AlllOng the vowels there are no clonble 
lettors; hnt one of the double letters (w) is 
cornpounded of t.wo vowels:  hence, a letter 
COIT1POtllldo(1 of two V01vels is not nccessari-
ly itself a vowel.  , 
In both these eases, it is plain that as long 
as  the l)l'emises  are  trne,  however  other 
fHcts  may be, the conclusions wlil be true. 
On the otllcr bliud, suppose that we reason 
as follows:-"A certain man had the Asiatic 
cholera.  He was in a state of  collapse, livid, 
qnite cold, and  without 11erceptible pulse. 
He 'was bled copiously.  During the process 
he cmnc ont of collapse, lind the next morn-
ing 'was well  enough to be about  'l'here-' 
fore, bleeding tends to cure the eholera." 
rl'hjs is  t1  fltil' probable illfCl'ence,  provided 
that the premises represent our whole know-
ledge of the maiter.  But if we knew, for 
exanlple, that recoveries from cholera were 
apt to be sudden, tU1d that the  physician who 
had reported this case had kno,r"l1 of a hnn-
elred other tdals of  the remedy without  CODl-
mUl1icatingthe  result, then the inference 
would lose ttll its validity. 
The absence of  knowledge which is essen-
tial to the validity of any probable argument 
relates to some qnestion which is determin-
ed by tIle argument itself.  '1'his question, 
like every other, is whether certain objects 
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of knowledge is either whether llcsides the 
ohjects  ~whioh, accordillg to the  premises, 
pos.;;eSR certain characters, any othm' objeets 
possess thcm; or, whether IJesic1cs the dmr-
acters which, according to the premises, be-
long to certain objects, any other characters 
not necessarily invoh'cd  in these belong to 
the same  objects.  In the former case, the 
reasoning proceeds as thougb  aU  the ob-
jects  whieh  have  certain  chm'aeters  were 
known, and  this  is induction; in the latter 
case, the inference  proceeds as thoug'h aU 
the characters req  llisite to the determination 
of  a  certain object Ot' clnss ,,,ere kno,vn, anll 
this is h,1fPot/,cfJi8.  This distinction, also, nmy 
be nmde more plain by examples, 
Suppose we count the llllluber of occur-
rences of the different letters ill  a  certaiu 
English book,  which we  1l1~Ly  call A.  Of 
course, every new letter 'which 'we add to 
our count will alter the relative llUlnhcr of 
occurrences of the c1ifiet'ent letters; but as 
we proceed with onr counting, this change 
will be less anc11ess:  Suppose that we finll 
thut as  we increase the  number of letters 
coullted,the relative llumbm' of  c's approach-
es nenrly lIt  pcr cent, of the ,vhole, . that of 
the t's 8} per cent"  thnt of t.he ac's 81Je,' cent., 
that of111e 8'S 7~' pc,' cent., &e.  Suppose we 
repeat the same  ohservations with half  a 
dozen  other English  writillgs  (-which  we 
may designate as n, 0, D, E, F, G) with the 
like result.  'J'l1en we 111ay infer that in ey-
cry English writing' of some length, the dif-
ferent letters occur with lIearly those rela-
tive frequencies. 
Now this argument llepends for its valid-
ity upon OlU' not knowing the proportion of 
letters in any Engli'3h writing besides A, B, 
0, D, E, Faull G.  For if we  know it in 
respect to fl, and it is not nearly the satne 
as in the others, our conclusion is destroyed 
at once; jf it is the same, then the legit  i-
HULte inference is from A, n, C, D, E, F, G, 
and II, anc1110t  frOIn  the 1irst seven alone. 
'.rhis, therefore, is an induction. 
Suppose, next, that a  piece  of writing in 
cypher is presented to us, without the l.ey. 
Suppose ,ve finll that it contains  something 
less than 2G characters, oue of which occurs 
about 11 per cent, of all the times,  anothcr 
8;t  PC?' cent"  another 8 pc']' cent., and another 
7t per cent.  SU1)POSO that when  ~we substi-
tute for these e, t, a anc1 s, respectively,  '1'1'6 
are able to sec  how single letters may be 
su.bstituted 1'01' eucll of the other charu.cters 
so_as to make sense in English, provided, 
howcyer, that we allm1' the  spelling'  to he 
wrong in sOllie cases,  If the writing'  is of 
UU)' considerable length, we may hirer ~with 
great probability that this is the me:ming of 
the eipher, 
'1'he ntlidity of this argument depends l1p-
on there being  110 otller known characters of 
the writing in cipher ,  ... hich would ImYc [lny 
weight in the lllntter; tor if there n.ro-ifwe 
know, for eXlllllple, whether or not tlwre iR 
any othm' f'olution of it-this must be allow-
ed its cfleet in supportillg or wenkenillg the 
cOllclu;;:ion.  'J'his, then, is hypotlwsis. 
All valid ren;.;oning is eitber dellueti\'e, in-
ductive, or hypothetic;  or else it combines 
two or more of these characters.  Deduction 
is pretty weU treated in most logieal text-
books;  bnt it will be necessary to sa.y a  few 
word;; about induction and hypothe;;is in or-
der 1:0 render wlmt  follows more intelligihle. 
Induction mny be defined as an nrg'lllIlcnt 
~whieh  proceccls upon  the nssmnptiun thatall 
the members of a class or aggregate lmvc all 
the eharactet's which are  COlli mon to ull those 
members of this clm;,~ concenJing wbieh it is 
knowll, wlietller they have these ehanLCters 
or lIot;  or,  in other ~worc1s, which ftssurues 
that that iil true or  a whole collection .",hieh 
is trne of :L number of instances talcen thnll 
it  n.t ranllom.  This might be calleel statistical 
arg:mnent.  In the long rml, it must gcncral-
1;\, ailonl pretty COlTcct couclusions  frQIll tt'ue 
pl·emises.  If  we have a bag of beans partly 
black n,ud partly white, by counting the rel-
ative proportions of the two colors in several 
difterent lmndfnls, we cUllapproxilllate more 
or  less  to  the relative  proportions ill the 
whole hag, since  a sufficient number ofhanU-
fuls would constitute all the beans hl the lmg. 
'rIw central characteristic and lcey to indnc-
tion  is,  that  by  taking  the  conclusion  so 
reached  as  major l)l'cmise of H  syllogism, 
and the  propositioJ~ stating that such ana 
such  objects  moe  taken  fronl  the  das::;  in 
question ltS  the  Ininor premise, the  other 
premise of the induction.  will follow from 
them tledllCtivcly.  'rhus, in the above ex-
ample we concluded that all booksin English 
have about lIt per cent. of their letters e's. 
l!'rol1l that as ma.jor premise, togHtltcr v,;ith 
the proposition that A, n, 0, D, E, F  nnd G 
are books in Englisll, it follO'.YS  deductively 
that A, B, 0, D, E, F  and G  ha,'c abont 111 
per cent.  of their letters e's.  Ac.cordingly, 
inc1uetion has been defined by Aristotle as 
the inference of the nuijor premise of a syl-
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sian.  'rhe function of an induction is to sub-
stitute for a series of many snbj  ects, a single 
one which embraces them and an indefiuite 
n~uIlber of others.  '.l'hus it is  a species .of 
"reduction of the manifold to unity." 
Hypothesis  may be defined  as  an argn-
ment which proceeds upon the assumption 
that a character which is known necessarily 
to involve a  certain l1111uber of others, may 
be probably predicated of any object which 
has aU tbe clw,racters which this chamcter 
is kuown to iuyolve.  .rust us induction may 
l}e  regarded as the inference of the major 
lwernise of a  syllogism, so hypothesis may 
be regarded as  the inference of the minor 
premise, feom  the other two propositions. 
'l'lms, the example taken above  consists of 
t\VO .such inferences of the minor premises 
Qf the following syllogisms: 
1. l'ivel'Y English writing' of some length in 
which such and such characters denote 
e,  t, a, and s,  has abont 111 per cent. of 
the ill'st soet of marks, 8i of the second, 
8 of the third, and H  of the fOlU'th ; 
'l'his secret writing is au English writing of 
somc length,  ill which sneh and  slwh 
el\,trftcters denote e, t, a, allcls, respect-
ively: 
.'. r1'lIi8 secret writing hlUI about In  PC1' ceni. 
of its characters of the first kind, 8J of 
the second, 8 of the third, and 71! of the 
fourth. 
2.  A  pasilage written with sllch an alphabet 
mal{es sens(\ when such and such letters 
are severally substituted for snch  ana 
SHell characters. 
1.'hi8 secret wI'iUng is writteu with snell an 
alphabet, 
.'. '1'llis  secret writing makes  sense  when 
such and snell substitutions are made. 
'1'110 funetion of hypothesis is to substitute 
for  fI.  great series of predieates forming  110 
unity ill  themselves,  11  Mngle  OIle (or small 
llumber) which involves them all, together 
(pel'rlaps)  with  an  indelinite  number  of 
Qthers.  It is, therefore, also n  reduction of 
a manifold to llnity.*  Every deductivc syl-




* Several persons versed in logic hfl.ve ob-
jected that I  have here quite misapplierl thc 
tC,rm  h?lpotllesis,  and that what I  so desig-
nate. is  an argument  from  analo[J'll.  It is 
a  sufficient reply to'  say  that the example 
of  the ci]?her  has. be(lll given as an apt il-
And as  tIle  minor  premise  in  this  form 
appears as antecedent or reason of a hypo-
thetical  proposition,  hypothetic  inference 
Inil,}, be called reasoning from conseqnent to 
antecedent. 
'l'lIe  argument  from  lmalog'y,  which  a 
popular writer  upon  logic  calls  reasoning 
from particulars  to  particulars,  derives its 
validity from its combining- thc characters of 
induction and hypothesis, being allalyzahle 
either into a deduction or an induction, or a 
deduction and a hypothesis. 
But though inference is  thus of three es-
sentially different species, it. also belongs to 
one genus.  tVe have seen that 110  conclu-
sion can be 1egitimatelyL clerived which conId 
not  have  been  reached  by  sllccessions  of 
arguments havillg two  pI'emis()s  c:wh, and 
implying 110 fact not asserted. 
Either of these premises is a  proposition 
aSi<ertillg'  thai; certain objects  have  eertain 
charaeters.  Every term. of such  a  proposi-
tion stands either for certain objccts or for 
cert.'iin charucters.  The conclusion may he 
regarded  as  a  proposition  substituted  in 
place  of  either  premise,  the  8uh;;;titlltion 
being jtlstified by the faet stated in the other 
premise.  'l']le conclusion is according'ly de-
rived from either  premise  by substitut.ing 
either anew subjeet for the subject of the 
premise,or  a new predicate for the predicate 
of the  1)1'emise,  or by both  SUbstitutions. 
N ow'the substitu[;iol1 of  oue term  for lUlother 
can be .instilled oniy so far as the term sub-
stituted represents only what is represented 
in the term replaced.  If, therefore, the con-
clusion be denoted by t1le formula, 
Sis Pj 
and this conclusion be derivcr], hya ellange 
of sllbjeet,  from  a  premise which mny on 
tllis account be expressed by the forl1lulu, 
11£ is P, 
then  the  other  p"'emise  mnst  assert  that 
whatever thing is represented by S  is repre-
sented by iVI, or that 
Eyery S  h;  all iVI; 
while, if the conclusion,  S  is P, is derived 
frol11  either premise by a  change of predi-
cate, that premise may be written 
S  is 1'.'£" 
Instr~l,tion of hypot;JlCSis by Descnrtes (H.nle 
10 CEuvres ohois10s:  1:'~iris, 18fi5, pag'(1 :;34), 
by Leihniz (Nouy. Ess., lib. 4,  ell. 12,  1!  l:l, 
Ed. Erdmann, p. 383 b), and (as I  learn from 
D. Stewart; 1,\ arks, vol. 3, pp. 3U5 et seqq.) 
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and  the  other  premise  must  assert that 
whatever charactcrs are  implied in Pare 
implied ill ]yI,  or that 
'Whatever is 111 is P. 
In either ease, therefore, the syllog;isrn nUlst 
be capable of expression in the form, 
S  is 11:[,.  JYI  is P: 
,', 8  is P. 
Finally,  -if  the  conclusion  differs  froUl, 
either of its premises, both in subject and 
L. Le SaO'c,  '1'11e term Hypothesis has been 
used in  the  follmYill~' scnses:-l. For the 
theme or proposition forming' the subject of 
discourse.  2,  1<'01' an assumption,  Aristotle 
divides theses or propositions adopted with-
out any renson into definitions anel hypothe-
ses,  The latter are propositions stating the 
existence of' something.  Thus tile geome-
tel'says. "Let there be a triangle."  3. For 
a  condition  in  a  general  sense.  IVe are 
said -to  seek  other  things than  happiness 
i~  v'lTo-{)(;aE:&J~"  conditionally  ~'be best repuh-
lic is tbe ideally pcrfect, the second the bese 
on earth,  the third  the best  t~  {!1ro{}€(jew~', 
Huder  the  circLlmstances.  I<~reedolll is the 
v'lTo{}eau; or comlitimi of dcmocracy.  '1.  For 
the antecedent of a hypothetical proposition. 
6. For an oratorieal question wllich assumcs 
facts.  6.  In the Synopsis of  Plielllls, for the 
rcferenee of H  snbject to  the things it de-
notes.  7. :tYIost cOll11TI0nly ill modern times, 
for  the  conclnsion  of  all  nrgumcnt  from 
consequence and consecrnent to antecedent. 
'l'his is my use of the  term,.  8.  For such a 
conclusioll when too 'wcak  to be ~1 theory 
accepted into the body of n science. 
1  give  it  few  allthorities  to  SllPllor{;  the 
seventh llse: 
Ghau-vi-n. - Lexicon  Hationale,  1st Ed.-
H  Hypothesis cst IJl'opm;itio, qnm assnrnitur 
:ul proballtlnm aliatn veritntem incognitmll. 
UequiruIII;  multi,  ut  lIrue  hypothesis "era 
esse eognoscatut'. etimn anteqllmn flpparent, 
nn alia ex e1\.  dec1uci  possint.  VeruITI aiunt 
alii, hoc ullum desiderari, ut hypot.hesis pro 
vera admittatur,  quod nempe ex hac talia 
deducitur,  qnm respondent l)hmllomenis, et 
S1ttisfaeiull t omnibus difHcl1ltatiblls, qum hac 
parte in re, et in lis  quru  de ett npp:1rent, 
occnrreban t." 
Newton.-"I-Iactenus phronomcna erelOl'lUll 
et marls Hostri per vhn gI'avitatis exposui, 
sed cansn,m gravitatis nonc1nm lIssigmwi. ..... 
Rationern  vero  harnm  gravitatis prop1'ie-
tatum ex pluenomenis 110l1dull1  potui cledn-
eel'e,  et  hypotheses  Don  :lingo.  Quicquic1 
enimex phrunomenis non  c1e'dl1citu1', hypo-
thesis  vocanda  cst  ......... In h1\.c Philosophi/\' 
PropositiolleS dednClllltnr ex phamomenis, 
ot reddulltnr  generales  per inductionem." 
Principia.  A <fin. 
Sir JVm. Hamilton.-" Hypothcses, that is, 
prop"sitions w1linh are assnrned 'with proba-
bility, in order to explain or prove something 
else W11ich cannot othenvise l)e explained or 
proved."-Lectures  on  Logic  (Am,.  Ed.), 
p.188.  -
"~'he name of hypothesis i,{more emphati-
\  10 
predicate, the form of statement of conclu-
sion  and  premise may be  so  altered that 
they shall have 11  common  term.  This can 
always be done, for if P  is the premise and 
G the conclusion, they may be stated thus: 
'1.'11e state of things represented in P  is rca], 
.  and 
r1'hc state of thing'S represented in a is real. 
In this  case  the  othcr premise  mllst ill, 
some forill virtually assort that every state 
cally given to provisory suppositions, which 
serve to explain tlle phenOluena in so far as 
observed, bllt which are only asserted to be 
true, if ultimately confirmed by a  complete 
induction.  "-Ibid, p. 364. 
"  \Vhell a phenomenon is presented Wl1h,h 
call  be explained  by no principle afforded 
through  experience,  we  feel  discontented 
and uneasy; !md there  arises  an  effort to 
discover some cause which mlly, at least pro-
visionally, accollnt for the outstanding phe-
nomenon iallcl this canse  is finally recognized 
as vnlid and true, if,  through  it, the given 
phellomenon is found to obtnin  a  full and 
perfeet  expluuution.  'l'be  judgment  in 
which aphellomenon is referred to such a 
problemlltic  cause, is called  a  HypotheSis." 
-Ibid, pp. 449, ·150.  See also  Lectures 011 
Metaphysics, p. 117. 
J. S. JJiill.-"  An hypothesis  is  anv Sltp-
position  'which  we  make  (either  ,,;iLhout 
actunl  evidence,  or  011  evidence  avowedly 
insutHdellt), in order to endeavor to dcduce 
from it conclusions in accordance with facts 
'which are known to be real; under tlle idea 
that if the conclusions to which tile hypoth-
esis leads  -are  kllOWG  trnths, the llypotl1esis 
itself either mURt be, or at least is likely to 
be trl1e."-Logie (Gth Ed.), vol. 2. p. 8. 
](ant.-"  If  all the consequents of  a cognition 
a1'e true, the cognition itself i8 i,rue.......  It  is 
allowuhle, therefore, to cQSlclmle  from con-
sequent toa reason, but without being able 
to <letermille this reason.  };'rOlll  the  eOIl1-
plexu;; of all consequents alone can ,,'e con-
clude the truth of  a determinate reasOll  ....... 
'l'he diftlc111ty  with this positive and  direct 
mode of inference (modtts ponens) is that the 
totality of' the conseqnents cannot be apo-
deietically reeognizecl, and that we are  there-
fore led by this mode of inference only to a 
probahle  1md  hypotllet·ically true cognition 
(I-Iypotheses)."-Lo~ilc by  Jiis(lhe  Werke; 
Ed. n,osenk. and Scn., vol. 3, p. 22l. 
"A hypothesis  is  the  jndgment  of  the 
truth of a  reason  OJ)  account of the suffi-
ciency of the eonsequents."-Ibid, p. 262. 
HCl'bart. -"  lVe  can  mal~e  hypotheses, 
thence deduce consequents, and afterwards 
see wl1etherthe latter accord  with experi-
ence.  Such snppositions are termed hypo-
theses."-Einleitung; "Verke, vol. 1, p. 53. 
Bcnekc.-" Afllrlnative  inferences - from 
consequent to antecedent, or hypotlH:lSes."-
Systemdcr Logik, vol. 2, p. 103. 
There would be  no· difficulty in greatly 
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of things such as is represented by (j is the 
state of things represented in P. 
All valid I'easoning, therefore, is of ono 
general form; and in seeking to reduce all 
meutul action to the formulre of valid infer-
ence, we seek  to  reduce it  to· one  single 
type. 
An apparent obstacle to the reduction of 
all mental action to tbe type of valid infer-
ences is the existence of fallacious reason-
ing.  Every argument implies the truth of 
a general prineiple of inferential procedure 
(whether involving some matter of fact con-
cernulg the subject of argument, or merely 
a maxim relating to a system of signs), ac-
cording to which it is a valid argnment.  If 
this principle is false, the argument is a fal-
lacy; but neither  a  valid  argument  from 
fal!:'e premises, nor an exceedingly weak, but 
not  altogether  illegitim:Lte,  induction  or 
hypothesis, however its force may be over-
estimated, however false its conclusion, is a 
fallacy. 
Now words, taken just as tIl ey stand, if in 
the form of an argument, thereby do imply 
whatever fact may  be necessary to  make 
the argument conclusive; so that to the for-
mal logician, who has to do only with the 
meaning of the words according to tllC prop-
er prinCiples of  interpretation, and not ,vith . 
the intention of the speaker as guessed at 
from  other  indications,  the  only  fHllacies 
should be such  as  are  simply absurd and 
contradictory, either because  theiL'  conclu-
sions are absolutely inconsistent with their 
premises,. or because they connect proposi-
tions by a species of illative conjunction, by 
which they cannot under any circnmstances 
be validly connected. 
But to the psychologist all  argument is 
valid only if the premises fl'om  which the 
mental conclusion is derivcd would be snHl-
eient, if true,  to justify it, either by them-
selves, or by the aid of other  propositions 
which had previonsly been  held for  true. 
But it is  easy  to show  that all inferences 
made  by man, which are noi; valid in this 
· sense, belong to fonr classes, viz.:  1.  '1'hoso 
whose premises are false;  2.  Those which 
• have some little foree, though only a littlc; 
· 3.  '1'11ose which result from confusion of one 
proposition with another; 4.  '1'11ose  which 
result  from  the  indistinct  apprnllOllsioll, 
wrong application, or falsity, of a rule of  in-
ference.For, if a  man were to commit a 
fallacy not of either of these  classes,  he 
would, from true premises conceived with 
perfcct distinctness, without  being led astray 
by any prejudice or other judgment serving 
as  a  rule of inferenee,  draw  a  conclusion 
which had really not the least relevancy. If 
this  eonld happen, calm consiuemtion and 
care could  be of little 1.1se  in thinking, for 
caution only scrves to insure our taking all 
the facts  into  account, and  to make those 
which we do take account of, distinct; nor 
can coolness do ll,nything more than to ena-
ble us to be cautious, and also to prevent 
our being affected by a passion in inferring 
~hat to be true  which  we  wish were true, 
or which we fear  may be  h'ue, or in fol-
lowing  some  other  wrong  rule  of infer-
ence.  But experience shows that the calm 
and careful consideration of the  same dis-
tinctly conceived premises (including prejn-
dices) will insure the pronouncement of the 
same judgment by all men.  Now if 11 fitl-
lacy belongs to the first of thesc four classes 
and its premises are false, it is to  be  pre-
sumed that the procedure of the mind from 
these  premises  to the conclllsion is either 
correct, or  elTS  in  one  of the  other three 
ways; for it cannot be snpposed  that the 
mere falsity of the premises should alreet the 
procedure of reason when that fhlsity is not 
known to reason. If  the fitllacy belong'S to the 
seeond class and has some force, howevel' 
Ilttle, it is lJ, legitimate probable argument, 
and belongs to the type of  valid illfereneo. If 
it  is of  the third class  :mel results from the COll-
fusion of one proposition with another, t,his 
confusion  must he owing  to a rcsemblallee 
between the two propositions;  that is to say, 
the person l'eaSoniIlg,  seoing that one pro-
position has some of the cliaracters which 
belong to the other, concludes that it has nll 
the essential clmrnetel's of the other, and is 
equivalent to it.  Now this  is It hypothetic 
inference, which though it  lll:ly be weak, amI 
though its  conclusion happens to l)e lhlso, 
belongs to the type of valid illferenfJcs; aud, 
therefore, as the nodus of the ihllllCY lies in 
this confusion, the procedure of Ule mind in 
these fallacies of the third class conforms to 
the formula of vnlit! iuferellce. If  the fhllacy 
belongs to the fourth dass, it either results 
from. wrongly applyillg or misllpprehending 
a rnle of infercllce, amI so is It fallacy of con-
fusioll, or it rcsults from adopting It wrong 
rule  of illfat'ellec.  In this lnltcr  {~aso,  this 
rule is ill faet taken as a premise, and thoro-
fore the false conclusion is owing' merely to 
the fall:1ity of a premise.  In every 11111ncy, 
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procedure of the mind conform.s  to the for-
mula of yalid inference. 
The third principle whose conseqnences 
we  have  to deduce  is, that, whenever we 
think, we have present to the consciousness 
some feeling,  image,  conception, or other 
representation, which serves as a Sign.  But 
it follows from our own existence (which is 
proved by the occurrence of ignorance and 
error) that everything which is present to 
us is  a  phenomenal manifestation of our-
selves.  '1'his  does not prevent its being a 
phenomenon of something without us, just 
as a rainbow js at once a manifestation both 
of the sun and of the rain.  When we think, 
then, we  ourselves, as  ""ye  are at that mo-
ment, appear  as  a  sign.  Now a  sign has, 
as such, three references: 1st, it  is a sign to 
some thought which interprets it; 2d, it is 
a  sign fo'!'  some  object  to  which in that 
thought it is equivnlent; 3d, it is a sif,'"!l,  in 
some respect or quality, which brings it into 
connection with its ohject.  Let us ask what 
the three correlates are to which a thought-
sign refers. 
1. 1Vhen we think, to what thought does 
tha1; thought-sign which is  ourself address 
itself!'  It may, through the lnedium of  out-
ward expression, which it reaches perhaps 
only  after  considerahle  internal  develop-
ment, come  to address itself to thought of 
anotl1er person.  But whether th1s happens 
or not, it is always interpreted by a subse-
quent thonght  of our  own.  If,  after any 
thought, the current of ideas flows on freely, 
it follows the law of mental association.  In 
that  case,  each  former  thought suggests 
.something to the thonght which follows it, 
i. e. is the sign of something to this latter. 
Onr train of thought may, it is true, be in-
terrupted.  But we mnst remember that, in 
addition to the principal element of thought 
at any 1I1Oment, there are a hundred things 
in our mind to which but a small fraction of· 
attention  or consciousness i8  conceded.  It 
does not, therefore, follow, because  a  new 
constituent of thought gets the uppermost, 
that. the  tr~lin  of  thought which  it dis-
placcs is broken off altogether.  On the con-
trary, fronl our second principle, that there 
is no intuition or cognition not determined 
by previous cognitions, it follows  that the 
striking in of a newexperienco is never an 
instautaneou8 affair, but i8 an e.vent occupy-
ing time, and coming to pass by a continu-
ous process.  Its prominence in conscious-
ness, therefore, must probably be the con-
snmmation of  a growing process; and if so, 
there is no sufficient cause for tho thought 
which hacl been the leading one just before, 
to cease abruptly and instantaneously.  But 
if  a train of thought ceases by gradually dy-
ing out, it freely follows its own law of  asso-
ciation as long as it lasts, and there is no 
moment at Wl1ich there is a thought belong-
ing  to  this  series, subsequently  to which 
there Is not a thought which interprets or 
repeats it.  'I'here is  no  exception, there-
fore, to the law that every thought-sign is 
translated  or interpreted in  a  subsequent 
one, unless it be that all thought comes to 
an abrupt and final end in death. 
2.  '1'he next question is:  For what does 
the thought-sign stand-What does it-name 
-whatisits8uppo8it~6m? Theout·ward thing, 
undoubtedly, when a real outward thing is 
thought of.  But stUl, as the t110Ught is de-
tenninecl by a previous thought of  the same 
object, it only refers to the thing through 
denoting this previous thought.  Let  us sup-
pose, for example, that Toussaint is thought 
of, and first thought of as n  negro, but Dot 
distinctly as  a man.  If this distinctness is 
afterward8 added, it is through the thought 
that a negro is a man,. that is to say, the sub-
sequent thought, man, refers to the outward 
thing by peing predicated of that previous 
thought, negro, which has been had of that 
thing.  If ·we after·wards think of Toussaint· 
as a general, then we think that this negro, 
this man, was  n  general.  And so in every 
case the subsequent thought denotes what 
was thOl;tght in the previous thonght. 
S.  '1'he thought-sign  stands for its object 
in the respect which is thought; that is to 
say, this re8pect is the immediate object of 
consciousness in the thought,  or, in otber 
words,  it is the thought itself, or at  ~ea8t 
what the thonght is thought to be in the 
subsequent thonght to wlrlch it is a  sign. 
We must now considcr two other proper-
ties of signs which are of great importance 
in the theory of cognition.  Since a sign is 
not identical with  the thing signified, but 
differs from  the latter in some respects, Ii; 
must· plainly have some  characters which 
belong to it in itself,  and have nothing to 
do with its representative function.  Thcse 
. I  call the material qualities of the sign.  .As 
examples of  such qualities, take in the word 
" man" its consisting of  three letters -in a 
picture, its beingflat and without relief.  In 
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being connected (not  in the reason bnt  really) 
with another  sig'n of the same objeet, or 
with the object itself.  'rIms, words would 
be of no yalue at all  unless they could be 
eonnected into sentences by lneallsof a  real 
copula which joins signs of the same thing. 
'1'he usefulness of some signs-as a weather-
cock, It tally, &c.-consists  wholly in their 
being really connected with the very things 
they signify.  In.the case of a picture such a 
connection is not evident, but it exists in t11e 
power  of  association  -which  connects the 
picture with the brain-sign which labels it. 
'.rhi,; rcal, physical eonnection of  a sign with 
its object"  either immediately or liy its con-
nection with another sign, 1 call the  PU'1'6 de-
mon-sb'ativ{} application of the Sign.  Now the 
representative function of a sig-n lies neither 
in its inaterial qnality nor in its pure demoll-
strative application; becallse it is something' 
which the  sign is, not in itself 01' ill a  renl 
relatiou to its Object, but which it is to a 
thougld, while both  of the  characters just 
detin611 belong to the sign indepemlently of 
its addressing lIny  thought.  And yet if I 
take all the things whiLlh have certain qual-
ities  and  ph.)!sically  conllect  tllel11  ,vith 
another series of things, each to euch, they 
become iit to be signs.  If  they are 110t  re-
garded as such they are not actually signs, 
but they are so iiI  the  same seuse, for ex-
_  ample, in which an nnseen  flower (Ian be snid 
to be red,  (;his  being also a term relath-e  to 
a mentnl affection. 
Consider a state of mind which  is  a eOll-
cept,ion.  It  Is n conception by vil-tue of hay-
ing a meaning, a logical compreiletl8ioll ; and 
ifit is applimlble  to any 0bject, it i8 because 
that object has  the characters containe!l ill 
the comprehension of this coneeption. Now 
the logical  comprehension of a  thought is 
ltSUltUy sniel  to consist of the thoughts COll-
tained  in  it ;  but  thoughts  nrc  eYents, 
acts of the mind.  '1'wo  thonghts are t\yO 
events  Ilel)tlrrttecl  in time, anrl  one  cannot 
liternlly be contained in t,he other.  It lllay 
be suid that all thoughts exactlysimilur are 
reg:lrded  as one; anci  tLu1t. to say that one 
thought  contains  auother,  means  t!HLt  it 
cont.ains  one exactly similar to that other. 
But  howc~m  two thoughts be similar?  '1',vo 
objects eltn  only  be  regarded  as  similnr if 
they are compared and bronght together in 
the mind.  'I'honghts have no existence ex-
cept in the mind; only as they are regarded 
do they exist.  Hence, two thonghts eallnot 
be similar unless they are brought together 
in the mind.  TIut,  as  to  their  existence, 
two thoughts are separated by an interval 
of time.  -Weare too apt to imagine that ,YO 
can fl'nme a thought similar to n past  thought, 
by mntching it with the latter, as thongh 
this past thought were still  pre8cnt to us. 
TIut it is plain that the knowledge that one 
thought  is similar to or in any way truly rep-
resentative  of another, caunot  be  derive<l 
from immediate perception, but must be !1l1 
hypctthesis (unquestionably fully justifiable 
by facts), and that therefore  the formation 
of such it representiIlg' thought must be de-
pendent upon a real eifective force behind 
consciousness, and not merely upon u men-
tal comparison. )Yhat we ml1stmean, there- . 
fore, by saying' that Olle concept is contained 
in another, is that we  normally -represent 
one to be in the other; that is, tlmt we form 
a  particular IdnQ of  jllr1gment,* of  ,yllicll tIle 
subject sigllifics  OIlC  COlleept  and  the pre-
dieate the other. 
No UlOnght in itself, then, 110 feeling in it-
selt: contains  lilly  others,  but is absolutely 
simple and unallHlyzablc; and to say that  it  iR 
eomposed of other thonghts and feeling-fl, is 
like suying thnt It movement IIpon !tstI'llight 
line  is composed of' the two movellHlntR  of 
whieh jtis the resultant; that is to say, it is a 
met.aphor, or 1iction,  parallel to the trut.h. 
Every thought, however artiIicial and com-
plex, is, so itlr as it is immediately present, 
a mere sensation without parts, and there-
fore,  in  itself,  without  similarity  to  allY 
other, but incomparable with any otlier and 
absolutely sui gcncri,s.t  vYhlltever is wholly 
ineompal'able ',yit.h  anythillg else is wholly 
illexpliellble,  becauRe  explunatioll  consists 
ill  bringing  things  under general laws or 
under llatural elasses. II  ence evcrythollgl1t, 
in so fill' HS  it is n feoling of a peculiar sort, 
is simply un ultimate, inexplicable fact.  Yet 
this does not conflict, \yith mypostLllate that 
that fhct should be allowed to stand as iucx-
plicable; fbI', 011 the one hHnel, we noyer can 
think, "Tlus is present to me,"  since, bofore 
* A judgment concerning a minimum of in-
fonnation, for the theory of which seo my  PIl-
per  011  Com prehension and Extensioll,  in  the 
Proceedings 01'  the ArnericlLll Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, vol. 7,  p. 426. 
t  Obsol'vl)  that 1 say W  itself:  1  am  not 80 
wild /LS  to deny thnt Illy sensa tiQ.ll of retl to-dny 
is like my sensation of red yesterdlLY.  I only 
say that the similarity cun  c()n,~ist  only  in  tho 
physiolugical  force  bt'hind  consciousness,-
which lonJs me to say, I recognh:e this feeling 
the same' as  the  former one, Itnd so does not 
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we have  time  to make  the reflection, the 
sensation is past,  and, on the other hand, 
'when once past, 'we  can  never bring back 
the quality of the feeling  as it 'was in and 
fO?' itself, or know ,yhat it was like in itself, 
or eyen discover the existence of  chis qnalit,y 
except by  a  corollary  fron1  our  general 
theory of  ourselves,  and  then  not in its 
idiosyncrasy, but only  as  something pres-
ent.  nut, as  something  present, feelings 
nre  all alike  and  req  L1ire  HO  eXlllanat.ioll, 
since they contain  only what is universal. 
So that nothing whieh 'we can truly precli-
cate  of  feelings  is  left  illexplieable, 1mi; 
only,sOlnething 'which ,"ye canllot retlective-
ly know.  So that we do  no!;  iltll into the 
con  tradiction of m.aking the Mediate imme-
diable.  Finally, 110  present aetual thought 
(which is a. lllCrc feelillg)  Iltls  nny menning, 
any intellectual vnlue;  fOl'  thiH lies not in 
what is  a.ctnally  thought, but in. wha.t thIS 
thought nmy be cOllllected with in repre-
sentation by subsequcnt thoughts;  80 that 
the II1ettlling' at' a. thought  is !tltogether  some-
thing virtuaL  It mny be Objected, t1int if no 
thonght has  any  metluing, all thonght is 
without, meaning.  T~nt this is a fallacy sim-
ilar to saying, t.hn.t, ifin no oue of tllC succes-
sive spaecs which a hoc1y!lUs t.hGl'e  is room 
for. motion,  there  is  110  room  for  JllOtion 
throughout the whole.  At no nne instant in 
Illy state of mind is there cognition or reprc-
sentation, bnt in the relation of my stlltes of 
mind  nt  different  instants  there  is.':;'  In 
short, the Immccliate (and therefore ill itself 
nnsusceptible oflnediation-the Unanalyz-
~tl.>le,  the Inexplienble,  Lhe  Unintel1ectual) 
runs  in  a  continnous stremn through our 
lives; it is the sum total of cOllHeionsness, 
whose m.ediation, which is the continuity of 
it, is brought about by a real eft'octive force 
behind consciousness. 
'rhus, we have in thought three elements: 
1st, the representative function which makes 
it a 7'C1J1'escntation;  2d, the pure denotative 
application, or real connection, which brings 
one thonght into 1'clation with nnother; and 
3d, the' m.aterial  quality,  or  how it feels, 
which gives thonght its quality.t 
'l'hat a  sensation is not necessarily'  an in.-
tuition, or tirst impressioll of sense, is very 
* Acconlin!!'ly) .i llst fiS  we sa.y  thfit n. body is 
in  motion,  unO.  Hot that  motion is in a  body 
we ought to say  that  we are in thought, anu 
not that thoughts are in us. 
t  On quality.  relation, and  representation, 
see Proceedings of the Americnn Acauemy of 
Arts anu SCiences, vol. 7) p. 293. 
evident in the case of the sense of beauty; 
and has been shown, upon pag'e 105 of tllis 
volume,  in the ease of sound.  When  the 
sensation  beautiful  is  cleterminecl by pre-
vious cognitions, it always arises as a  pl'ecli-
cate;  that  is, ,ve  think that sam  etIling' is 
beautiful.  ,\Vhellever a sensation thus nrises 
in consequenee of others, induction shows 
that tho,;e others are more or less C0l11l1lica-
ted.  'l'hns, the  sellsation  of· a  particular 
kind of sound arises in consequence of im-
preSSions  upon  the various  nerves of the 
ear being combined in a particular ,yay, and 
following one another with a  certain rapid-
ity.  A  sensation  of color  depends  upon 
impressions  upon  the  eye  following  one 
another in a  regular  m.allner,  and  with a 
certain rapidity.  'rhe sensation of beauty 
arises upon a manifold of other iInpressions. 
AmI this will be found to hold good in all 
cases.  Secondly, aU these sensations are in 
themselves simple, or more so than the sen-
s:ttions which give rise to them.  According-
ly, a sensation is a simple predicate tal,en in 
place ora complex predicate; in ot11e1' wordS, 
itfulftls the function of an hypothesis.  But 
the general principle that  eyery thing  to 
'which such and such a  sensation belongs, 
Ims suell anll snch It complicated series of 
predicates, is not one dctermined hy reason 
(as we llave  seen), but is  of an arbitr!L1y 
nature.  Hence, the class of hypothetic in-
ferences  which the  arising of a.  sensation 
resembles, is  th!lt of reasoning  fron"1  uefl-
11ition  to  definitnm,  in which  the  mn:ior 
premise is of an arbitrary nature.  Only in 
this inocle of reasoning, thi8premise is de-
termined by the conventions of langunge, 
and  expresses the occasion upon w11ich  a 
word i'3 to be used;  and in the formation of 
a sensation, it  is determined by the constitu-
tion of 0111'  nature,  and expresses the occa-
sions npon  Wllich  sensation,  or a  natural 
Inental sign,  arises.' '1'l1us,tlie  sensation, 
so. fin: as it represents something, is determ-
ined, according to a logicnllaw, by previous 
cognitions;  that is to  say, these cognitions 
detcrmine that there  shall be a  scnsation. 
nut  so fiu" as the sensation is  a  mere feeling 
of  a particular sort, it is determined only by 
an inexplicable, occult po>yer; nnd so far, it 
is. not a representatio)1, but only the l.uaterial 
qU[l,lity of a represenbltiOl1;  For just as in 
reasoni11g from  definition to c1eiinitum, jt is 
indil:fel'ent to the logician how the den  ned 
word si1nll  sound, or how lnany letters it 
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tionn! word, it is not determjned by an in-
wm'd law how it  shall feel in itself.  A feel-
ing', therefore, as a  feeling,  is  merely the 
material quality of  It mental sign. 
But there is no feeling which is not also a 
representation, a predicate of something de-
termined logically  by the feelings  which 
precede it.  For if there  are any such feel-
ings not predicates, they are the emotions. 
Now every emotion has a snbject.  If  n man 
is angry, he is snying to himself that this or 
that is vile and outrageous.  If he is in joy, 
he is  saying  "this is delicious."  If he is 
wondering, he is saying" this is strange." 
In short, whenever a man feels, he is think-
ing of something. Even those passions which 
have  no  definite  object-as melullcholy-
-only come to consciousness through tinging 
the objects ofthougkt.  That which makes us 
look upon, the emotions more as affections 
of self than other cognitions, is that we have 
found them more dependent upon onr acci-
dental situation at the moment tllan other 
cognitions; but that is only to say that they 
are cognitions too narrow to be useful.  '1'hc 
emotions, as a little  observation will show, 
arise when our attention is strongly drawn 
to complex and inconceivable circumstances. 
Fear arises when we cannot predict our  fate; 
joy, in thc case of certain indescribable and 
pecnliarly complex sensations.  If  there are 
some indications that something greatly for 
my illtcrest, and which I  have anticipated 
would happen, may not happell; and if, af-
ter weighing  probal)iJities,  and  invellting 
safeguards, and straining for further infor-
mation, I filld myself unable to coine to any 
fixed conclusion in reference to the future, 
in the place of that  intellectual hypothetic 
inference which I seek, the feeling of  anxiety 
arises.  -When something ha})l)ens for which 
I  canllot  acconnt,  I  wonder.  When I  en-
deavor to realize to myself what I never call 
do, a pleasure in the future, I hope.  "I do 
not understand you," is the phrase of an an-
gry man.  '1'he indescribable, thc ineffable, 
the  incomprehensible,  commonly  excite 
emotion;  but  nothing  is· so  chilling  as a 
scientific explanation.  'l'lms an emotion is 
always a simple predicate SUbstituted by an 
opel'ation of the mind for a highly compli-
cated predIcate.  Now if we consider that a 
very complex predicate demands  explana-
tion by means of  an hypothesis, that that  hy-
pothesis mnst be a simpler predicate substi-
tuted for that complex one; and that when 
we have an emotion, an hypothesis, strictly 
spealdng, is Imrdly possible-the analogy of 
the parts played by emotion and hypothesis 
is very st-riking.  ~'here is, it is true, this dif-
ference bctween an emotion and ttn intellec-
tual hypothesis, that we have reason to say 
in the case of the latter, that to whatever the 
simple hypothetic predicate  can be applied, 
of  that  the complex precUcate is true; where-
as, in tile case of an emotion this is a propo-
sition for which no reason can be given, but 
which is determined merely by our em'o-
tional  constitution.  But this  cOl'l'espollds 
precisely  to  the difference between hypothe-
sis and  reasoning from definition to defini-
tum, and thus it would appear that emotion 
is nothing but  sensation~  '1'here appears to 
be a difference, however,  between emotion 
and sensation, and I  would state it as fol-
lows: 
There is some I'cason to thinl, that, corre-
sponding to every fecling within  us, some 
motion takes place in onr bodies.  '1'11i8 prop-
erty of the thought-sign, since it  has no ra-
tional dependence upon the meaning of the 
sign, may  be  compared  with wlJab  I  have 
called the material  quality of the sign; but 
it differs from tlle latter inasmuch ns it  is not 
essentially necessary that it should be felt 
in order that there should be any thought-
sign.  In the casc of a sensation, thc mani-
fold  of impressions which prccede and de-
termine it are 1101; of ;t kind, the bodlly mo-
tion corresponding to which comes from any 
large ganglion or from the brain, and proba-
bly for this reason the sensation produces no 
great commotion in the  bodily  organism; 
and the  seusation  itself is  not a  thought 
which has a very strong influence upon the 
current of thought except by virtue of the 
information it may serve to afford. An emo-
tion, on the other hand, comes much later 
in the dcvelopment of thought-I mean, fur-
ther from the first beginning of the cogni-
tion of its object-and the thonghts which 
determine  it already  have  motions corre-
sponding to them in the brain, or the chief 
ganglion;  conseqnently,  it produces large 
movement;.s in the body, and, independently 
of its representative vnlue, strongly l1ifc(It.'> 
the  current  of thonght.  '1'he  lLllilIllil  mo-
tions to which I uUude, are, in the first placo 
and obviously, blushing, blenching, staring, 
smiling, scowling, ponting, laughing, weep--
ing,  sobbing,  wriggling,  flinching,  trem-
bling,  being  petlified,  sighing,  sllilJing, 
shrugging, groaning, 1leartsinldllg, trepida-
tion, swelling  of  the heart,  etc, etc.  ~'o 
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these rnay, perhaps, be added, in the second 
place, other more complicated actions, which 
nevertheless  spring from a  direct impulse 
~tnd not from deliberation. 
'l'hat which distinguishes both sensations 
proper and emotions from  the feeling of a 
thought, is that in the case of the two former 
the material quality is made prominent, be-
cause the thought has no relation of reason 
to the thoughts which determine it, which 
exists ill the last case and detracts from the 
attention given to  the  mere  feeling.  By 
there being no relation of reason to the de-
termining thoughts, I  lUean  that there is 
noLhing in the content of the thought which 
explains why it should arise ol1ly on occa-
$ion of  these determining thoughts. If there 
is such a relation of  reason, if  the thought is 
essentially limited in its application to these 
objects, then  the  thought  comprehends a 
thonght other than itself; in other words, it 
is then a cOlnplex thought.  An incomplex 
thought  can,  thercfore,  be  nothing but a 
sensation  or  emotion,  having  no  rational 
character.  This is very different from the 
ordinary doctrine, according to which the 
very highest and most metaphysical concep-
tions are absolutely simple.  I  shall be asked 
how  snch  a  conception of a being  is to be 
analyzed, or whether I  can ever define Dne, 
tWD, and tlwee,  without a  diallele.  Now I 
shall admit at once  that neither  of these 
concept;ions can be separated into two oth-
ers  higher  than  itself; and in that sense, 
therefore, I  fully  admit that  certain  very 
metaphysical and eminently inteUectualno-
tions  are  absolutely  simple.  But though 
these concepts cannot be deflned by genus 
and  difference,  there  is  another  way in 
which they  can be  defined.  All  determ-
ination is by negntion;  we can first recog-
nize  any  character  only  by  putthlg  an 
objcct whiclJ.  possesses it into  comparison 
with  an  object  which  l)oSseSses  it  not. 
A  conception,  therefore,  which was quite 
universal in  every  respect would be  un-
recognizable  and  impossible.  We  do  not 
obtain  the  conception  of  Being,  in  the 
sense implied in  the copula, by observing 
that all the things which we  can think of 
~lave  something  in  common, for  there  is 
no such thing to be observed.  We get it by 
reflecting upon signs-words. or thoughts; 
-we observe that diflerent predicates may 
be. attached to the same  subject, and that 
each  makes  some  conception  applicable 
to the  subject;  then  we  imagine  that a 
. subject has  something true  of  it merely 
because a predicate (110 matter what) is at-
tached to it,-and that we call Being.  The 
conception of being is, therefore, a  concep-
tion about asign-.a thought, or word;-and 
since it is not applicable  to every sign, it is 
not primarily universal, although it is so in 
its  mediate  application  to  things.  Being, 
therefore, may  be  defined; it may be de-
fined, for example, as that which is common 
to  the  objects  included in any  class, and 
to the objects not included in the same class. 
But it  is nothing new to say that metaphysi-
cal conceptions are primarily and at bottom 
thoughts  about  words,  or thoughts about 
thoughts; it is the doctrine both of Aristotle 
(whose categories are parts of speech) and 
of Kant (whose categories are the charactel's 
of different kinds of propositions). 
Sensation and the power of abstraction or 
attention may bc regarded as, in one sense, 
the sole constituents of all thought. Having 
cOllsidet'ed  the  former, let us now attempt 
some analysis of the latter.  By the force of 
attention, an emphasis is put upon Ol1e  of 
the  objective  elements  of  consciousness. 
'1:11is emphasis is, therefore, not itself an ob-
ject ofhnmediate consciousness; and in this 
respect it  c1iflers  cntirely  from  a  feeling. 
Therefore, since the emphasis, nevertheless, 
consists in some  effect upon consciousness, 
and so can exist only so far as it affects our 
knowledge; anu since an act cannot be sup-
posed to determine  that; which ]?recedes it 
in time, this act can consist only in  tXvbellpa-
city which the cognition emphasize!huv; for 
producing an effect l;lpon memory,.lus other-
wise influencing subsequent tilougn~~'  'rhis 
is confirmed by the fact that attention is a 
matter of continuous quantity; for continu-
ous  quantity, so far as we know it, reduces 
itself in the last analysis to time,  Accord-
ingly, we find that attention does, in fact, 
produce a very great efiect upon subsequent 
thought.  In the first  place, it strongly af-
fects memory, a thought being remembered 
for a longer time the greater the attention 
originally paid to it.  In the second place, 
the grcater the attention, the closer the con-
nection and the more accurate the logical 
sequence of  thought.  In the third  place, by 
attention a thought may be Tccovered which 
has been forgotten.  From these facts, we 
gather that attention is the power by which 
thought at one time· is connected with and 
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or, to apply the conception of thought as a 
sign, that it is the pure demonstrative  appli-
cat-ion of  a thought-sig'n.  ,. 
Attention is roused when thc same phe-
nOlIlellon presents itself repen.tedly  on dif-
ferent  occasiolls, or the  same  predicate in 
different subjects.  vVe see that A  has a cer-
tain character, that B  has  the same,  a has 
the same; and this excites our attention, so 
that we  say,  .•  :I'lwse  have this character." 
~'hus atteution is an act of induction;  but it 
is an induction which does not increase  on1' 
knOWledge,  llecause  our  "tl1ese"  cm:ers 
nothing but the iustances  experienced.  It 
is, in short, an argulllelltfrom enumeration. 
Attention producos eftects UpOll  the ner-
vous system.  Thesc  elfects  m'e  habits, or 
nervous associations,  A  habit arises, when, 
hfwilJgliad the sensation of performing a 
certain [l,et, 'tn,  on several  occasions a, b, c, 
we eome 'to do it npon every occurrence of 
the gene,gtl event, t, of which a, band care 
special rases.  'l'hat is to say, by the cogni-
tion that 
Every case of it, b, or c, is a case of  tn, 
is dctermiJled thc41ognition t.hat 
Every case of l is it casc of 'In. 
~'hns tho formation of a  habit is an illduc-
tion, a~'Hs therefore  necessarily cOllnect.ed 
with attention or abstnwtioll.  Volulltmyapr 
tion;;;, result from the sensations produce;l hy 
~,la~,  , ','  s, in~t.inctive actions result from ou, r 
on  I  "n.tiu e.  ' 
,  , .,,', '0 tlms seen that every sort of mod-
. .iil,,!  t~l;;,ri of eo  Ilsciousness -A  tten  tio n, 8e11-
satP  11  I'd Understanding-is nIl inference. 
But  l\~ncTbj~ctioll may. be made that; infer-
ence (,~t11s only with general terms, nlHl that 
~m  image, or absolutely singnlm· rel)resenta-
tiOll, caJmot thorefore be inferred. 
"Singular" and "individual" are equivocal 
terms.  A  singular may moan that ,vllich 
call be but in one place at one time.  III this 
sense it is not opposed to general.  :I'lw Bun 
is a singnlar in this sense, but, as is explain-
ed in cvery good treatise on logiC, it is a 
general tcrm.  I  may have a very general 
COllceptiOll of llermolaus .11nrbarus, but still 
I  conceive  him  ouly as'  nolo  t.o  be in one 
place at one timc.  'Vhen Itll  image is  said 
to be singalm', it is  Ineallt that it is nbso-
lutely dctet'millate  ill  all respects.  l~l'cry 
possible charnctcr, or the negn.tive thorcof, 
'must be true ofsl1ch an ilnage. III the words 
~; of  the most eminent  oxpounder of the doc-
. 'tri\1e, the image of a man "must be either 
of  a white, or a black, or a tawny; It straigllt, 
or It crooked; it tall, or a low, or a  llliddle-
sized man,"  It  must he of a man with his 
1110uth 011eIl or his rnonth shut, 'whose hair 
is precisely of such  and sneh a shade, and 
whose figurc  hus  precisely  sneh and sneh 
IJroportions.  No  statcment of Locke has 
been so scouted by all friends of illluges ns 
his denial that the "iden." of' a tl'htllgle must 
be eithor of an obtuse-angled, right-angled, 
01' acute-angled triangle. ,Ill fl1et, tho image 
of a triangle must be of one, each of ,,,11ose 
angles is of it  certain number  of degrees, 
minutes, and seconds. 
This being so, it is n.ppm'ent that no mall 
has it true image of tlle l:oad to his ofliee, or 
of nny Ol;1lCl' real thing.  Indeed he has  llO 
image of it at all unless he call not only ree-
ogllize it, lmt i111ngines  it (truly or fnlsely) 
in all its illfillite deh1i,ls.  T11is boil Ig tIle ease, 
it  becomes  very cloiT!')tful  whcther we ever 
have any such thing as an image ill OUl' imngi-
uation. Please, reader, to look at  It brig-hi; rod 
hook,  01' other bl'ighUy colored olljcd, tllld 
theu to slInt your eyes alld say wllc1:hcJ' you 
see  that color, whether brightly or IhillUy-
whether, indeed, therc is allythiug like sight; 
there,  llnme aml  the other  l'ollo\\"ors  of 
Bcrkeley maiutain thnt there is 110 dW'el'ence 
between the sight; ami the momory ofthc red 
book exeept in  "their diJl'ercut  Lleg'l"ees of 
force anel vivaeHy."  "Tho colors whleh {,l!e 
lllCJ1lOry  employs," says HllUJe,  "nrc fnint 
and (lull cOll1pnreLl with those in  which 0111' 
original  perceptlons  m'o  clotllCt1."  It'  tlli8 
were a correct stntement of the  (1iJrOl'OlH~Il, 
we should remembet' the hookns  IH~ill)!; lCfis 
red than it is;  whoreas, in f,lel;, we remCIll-
her the color with vct'y greut; prceiHioll Itl!' tl, 
fow moments [plensc to test; tilis point., l'cttcl-
m·J,  although we do Hot;  see any thing like 
it.  We  carry  a"wny  ltosolutely  llOthing' of 
the color  except  the consciollsnes8  tlmt  qVi! 
could recognizlJ it.  As a fnrtlwr proof of  tJli~, 
I  will request;  the  render to try :L little ex-
periment.  Let him call np, if Iw  CHII,  ill(} 
image of a horse-Hot of one "which  he IHI~ 
ever seen, but of an illlag'in:u'y OJlo,-tllltl 
before readillg further let him hy (!OHt.tlIlI-
platiou*fix the  iH1ugc ill hi!:! memory ....  : 
*  No person whose nl1.th'e  tongue is Eng-Jish 
will need to be inftlrlllcd  that contemplation is 
csst.'lItially  (1)  In'otrllctecl  (2)  YOlulltnry,  111111 
(:3)  all fiction, Hnd  thnl. it is never IISet]  for thllt 
which is set forlh  to  the mind  in  this nct,  A 
foreigner elln  COllvirWtJ  hilllsdf of tllis  hy t1m 
proper study of English writPfB.  ThUll, Lndw 
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Has the reader clone as requestecl? for I pro-
test that it is not fair play to read further 
without doing so. ---Now, the reader can 
say in general of v;hat color that horse was, 
whether grey, bay, or black.  But he proba-
bly cannot say p1'ccisely of what shade it  was. 
He cannot state this as exactly as he could 
just after having  seen such  a  horse.  But 
why, ifhe had an image in his millcl ~which 
no more had the general color than it harl 
the p:wticular shade, has the latter vanished 
so instantaneollsly femn his Inernory while 
the  former  still  remains?  It may be  re-
plied, tlult we always forget thc details be-
fore ,ve do the Irwre general characters; but 
that  this  answcr is  ill  sufficient is, I  think, 
shown  by  the  extreme  disproportion  be-
tween  the  length of time  that the exact 
shaUe  of SOlllething'  looked  at  is remem-
bered as compared with that instnntaneous 
obli  vion to the exact shade of the thing im-
agined, and  the but slightly superior vivid-
ness of the  mom.ory of the  thing  seon as 
cOlnpared ,'lith  the  l1lClnOl'Y  of the thing 
imagined. 
'l'he ~nominalist;s, I  suspect, confound to-
gether thinldng a trianglc without thinking 
that; it is either equilateral, isocelcs, or sen-
lene, and'  thinldng :1 triangle withont thillk  ... 
ing  whether it is  eqnil~tteral, isoceles, or 
sculene. 
It  is important to remember that we haye 
no  intniLivc ~  power  of  distinguishing  be-
tween one suhJective nlOde of cognition and 
another;  null hence often think that some-
thing is presented to ns as It pictlU'e, while 
it is really constructed from  slight data by 
the underfltn.nding.  'l'his  is  the ease with 
dreams, as is SllOWll by the fl'eflllcnt impos-
sibility of g'iving  an intelligible account of 
one wiHlOut adding somcthing which we 
feel was not  in ·tlle  ch-cam.  itself.  JHany 
dreams,  of  which  the  wakillg  lnemory 
Book II., chap. HJ,§ 1) says, "H it [an  ideal 
be held there [in view]  long  undel'  fltlentive 
consideration,  'tis  Cuntemplation";  and ugnin, 
(ibld.,  Book II., chap. 10, § 1)  "Keepin~ the 
l,zlla, whieh is  brought into it [the inindl for 
some- time  actually  in  view,'  which  is  caHec1 
OontemplatlO1l."  'rhis term is theret()re unfitted 
to  tran"late  A IlSChaullll.tJ;  for  this  ~ latter does 
not imply an act which is necessarily protract-
ed or  volun!!1ry,  a.nd  denotes  most usually  It 
men  tal  presentation,  some li  mes n. faclll ty, less 
often  the  reception  of an  imrn'cssioll  in  the 
lTIind, and seldom, if evcr, an  action.  '1'0 the 
translation of .J1f1scltaltung by intuition, tllere is, 
at le!tst, no such insnfferable ol~jection. Etymo-
logically the two  wOl'!lsprecisely  eorrespond. 
'1'he original philosophical meaning of intuition 
Inakes elaborate and consistent stories, must 
probably have been in fact mere Jumbles of 
these  fcelings of the  ability  to  recognize 
this and that which I have just alluded to. 
I  will no'w go so far as to say that we have 
no images even in actual perception. It  win 
be sufficient to prove this in the cnse of vis-
ion; for if, no pictnre is seen when ,ve look 
at an object, it will not be claimed  that; 
hearing,  tonch,  and the.  other  senses, are 
superior to sight in this respect.  'I'hat the 
picture is not painted 011  the nerves of the 
retina is  absolLltely certain, i1;  as l)hysiol-
ogists inform us, these nervcs are needle-
points  pointing  to the light  and at· dis-
tances  considerably greater than thc  min-
imum visibile.  The  same  thing is  sho~wn 
by  om: not  being  able  to  perceive  that 
there  is It large  blind spot near the mid-
d1e of the retina.  H, then, we have a pic-
ture  before  us  when  we  see,  it  is  one 
consti"l1cted  by the mind  at the snggei3'tion 
of  previons  sensations.  Supposing  these 
sensations to be signs, the understmidillg hy 
reafloning  from  them  could  attain all the 
knowledge of outward things which we de-
rive  from  sight, while the sensations  are 
quite  inadequate  to  fOrIning  an  image or 
rcpl'csentation absolutely  detennillate.  If 
we hnve snch an image or picture, we must 
ha,ye in our minds a repl'esentatioll of a Stu·-
fuce which  is only a part of  evc1'Y  slll'tllCe 
we see,  and  we  lTll1st  sec  that  eapl~lJal't;, 
however  small, has sncll and sucl:L:a,c·olor. 
lfwelookfrom some distance at a s:pecli:led 
surface, it seem.s as if\ve did not  see whether 
it were speckled or not; but if we have an 
image hefore us, it must appeal' to us either 
as speckled, or as not speckled.  Again, the 
eye by education comes to distinguish mi-
nute differences of color; but if  we see only 
absolutely determinate images, we mnst, 110 
less before Ollr eyes are trained than aftcr-
was a cognition of the present manifold in that 
character; and it i8110\". commonly used,  as a 
modern writer says, "to include all tho products 
01 the perceptive (externul  Ol~ intermit) and im-
aghmtiye liteulties; every' act of consciousness, 
in short, of which the immediate object is an 
individual,  thing,  ~ act,or  state of  mind,  pre-
sented under the. condition of distinct existence 
in  space  and  ~  time."  l?iuaily,  we have  the 
authority of Kant's  own  example for U'anslat-
ing his  Llnsc7wtltL/lg  lIy  Inillitlls;  and,  indeed, 
this is the common usage of Gerlllans writing 
Latin.  Moreoycr, in/uitiv frequently  replaces 
U11RClwtlcnd  or ar18cluwltch.  If  this constitntes 11. 
misunderstanding of Kant,  it is one which is 
sh!l~red  by him!;elf and nearly all his country-
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wards, see  each color as particularly such 
and such a  shade.  'rhus to suppose  tlmt 
we have an image before us when we see, 
is  not only a  hypothesis  which  explains 
nothing whatever, but is one which actually 
creates  difficulties  which  require new hy-
potheses in order to explain them away. 
One of these difficulties arises from the 
fact that the  details are less  easily distin-
guished  than,  and forgotten  before,  the 
general circllmstances.  Upon this theory, 
the general  features  exist in the details: 
the  details are, in fact, the whole picture. 
It  seems,  then,  very  strange  tllat  that 
which exists  only  secondarily  in the, pic-
tUre  should  make  more  impression  than 
the picture itself.  It is true that in an old 
painting the  details  are  not  easily  made 
out; but this is because we know . that the 
blackness is the result of time, and is no part 
of the picture itself.  '1'here is no difficulty 
in making out the  details of the picture as 
it looks at present; the only difficulty is in 
gueSSing what it used to be.  But if  we have 
a picture on the retina, the minutest details 
are  theJ'e as much as, Hay, more than, the 
genem! outline and significancy Mit,  Yet 
that which must actually be seen, it is ex-
tremely  difficult  to recognize;  while  that 
which is only abstracted from what is seen 
is very obvious. 
But the conclusive argument against our 
having any images, 01' absolutely determin-
ate representations  in perception, is that in 
that case we have the materials in each s11ch 
representation for an infinite amouut of  con-
scious cognition, which we yet never become 
aware of.  Now there is no meaning in say-
ing  that we  have  something in our lnillds 
which never has the)east eifect on what we 
are cOllscious of knowing.  '1'11e  most  that 
can be said is, that when we see we are lmt 
in a condiIJon in Wl1ich  we  are able to get 
It very large and perhaps indefinitely great 
amount of knowledge of the visible qualities 
of  objects. 
.iVIoreover,  that perceptions  are not ab-
solutely determinate and Singular is obvious 
from the fact that each sense is an abstract-
ing mechanism.  Sight by itself informs us 
only of colors and forms.  No one can pre-
tend that; the images of sight are detel'min-
• ate in reference to tnste.  'l'hey are, there-
fore,  so far general that they are neitllel' 
sweet nor non-sweet, bitter nor nOll-bitter, 
having savor or insipid.  ' 
The  next  question  is  whether  we have 
any  general  conceptions  except  in  judg-
ments.  In  perception, where  we  InlOW  a 
thing  as  eXisting,  it is  l)lain that there is 
a  judgment that  the  thing  exists,  since  a 
mere  general  concept  of  a  thing is in no 
case  a  cognition of it as  existing.  It  lias 
usually been said, however, that we can call 
up any concept without making;  any judg-
ment; but it seems that in this case we only 
arbitrarily Sllppose onrselves to Inwe an ex-
perience.  In ol'der to conceive the llumbC'r 7, 
I  suppose, that is, I  arbitrarily malm the hy-
pothesis or judgment, tha.t  there arc certtlin 
points before my eyes, and I judge tlw.t thcse 
are seven.  '1'11is seems to be the most simple 
and rational vicw of the matter, and I  may 
add that it  is the one which has becn adopted 
by the best logicians.  If this .  be  the  case, 
w11at  goes by  the  name of the association 
of images  is  in  rcality  all  association  of 
judgments.  'rhe association of ideas is  said 
to  proceed according  to threc pI'inci  pIes -
those  of resemblance, of contiguity, and of 
ca1lsality.  But it would be  equally true  to 
say that signs denof:e  WJlut  they do on the 
three principles of resemblancc, cOlltiguity, 
and causality.  'l'here can  be  no  question 
that anything is  a  sign of' wlmtevel' is as-
sociated with it by resemblance,  by conti-
guity, or by causality:  nor can i:herc be Hlly 
doubt that any sign recalls the thing sigui-
fleel.  So, then, the association of lueug con-
sists  ill  this,  that  a  judgmeut  occasions 
another judgment, of which  it is  the sign. 
Now this is nothillg less ]lor  more  than in-
ferenoe. 
Everytlling in which we talw the least in-
terest creates in us its own particular emo-
tion, however slJght this may be.  'l'lli;; emo-
tion  is  a  sign and u predicate of the thing. 
Now, when [t thing resembling tIlis thing is 
IJl'esented  to  us, a  similar  cmotion  arises; 
hence, we immediately infer tllat the lattor is 
like  the  former.  A  formal logician of the 
old school may say, that in logic 110 term can 
enter into the conclUsion 'which lind not been 
contained in tJlO premises, and that therefore 
the  suggestion of sou]{Jthing  new must be 
essentially  diflbrent from  inference.  13 nt I 
reply that that rule of logic applies only to 
those arguments which aro teclmimtlly called 
completed.  ''Ve can fmc! do reasoll-
Elias was a man; 
.'. Ho was mortlll. 
And tllis argument is j nst as valid as the full 








\ Sorne  Consequences  of Four  Incapacities.  155 
major  premise of the latter  happens to be 
true.  If to pass from the judgment "Elias 
was a  man"  to  tIle  judgm.cut  "Elias was 
mortal," without  actnuliy  saying to  one's 
self that ".A.lllnen are mortal," is not infer-
ence, then the term "inference" is used in 
so restricted a sensc  tbat  iuferences  hardly 
OCUllr outside of a logio-book. 
What is here saicl of association by resem-
blance is true of all association.  All associa-
tion is by signs.  Everything has its subject-
ive or emoti.onal  qualities, which are attrib-
uted  either  absolutely  or relati.vely, or by 
conventional imputation to anything which 
is a sign of it.  And so we reason, 
The sign is such anel such; 
.'.  '.1'be sign is that thing. 
r.rhis conclusion receivillg  , however, a modifI-
cation, owing to other considerations, so as 
to become-
r.1'he sign is almost  (is representative of) 
that thing. 
We come now to the consideration of the 
last of .the four principles whose consequen-
ces  we were to truce;  namely, that the ab-
solutely incognizableis absolutely inconceiv-
able.  '.rhat upon  Cartesian.  principles  the 
very l'ejJlities of things can never be known 
in the least, nlOst competent persons must 
long ugo have been convinced.  Hence the 
breaking  forth  of iclealism,  which  is  es-
scntially anti-Curtesian, in evcrY direction, 
whether  among  empiricists  (Berkeley; 
Hume),  or  among  no-ologists  (Hegel, 
Fichte).  The principle  now  brought  un-
dOl,'  discussion· is  dircct1y  idealistic;  for, 
since the ll1.el1l1ing  of a word is the concep-
tion  it conveys,  the  absolutely  ineogniza-
ble  has  110  nH~aniIlg  because  no  concep-
tion attaches to it.  It  is, therefore, a mean-
ingless word;  and, consequently, whatever 
is meant by any term as  "the real" is cog-
nizable in some degree, and so is of the lla-
ture of a cognition, in the objective sense of 
that term. 
At any  Inoment we are in possession of 
certain  informn,tion, that is,  of  cognitions 
wllieh have  been  logically  derivcd by in-
duction  and  hypothesis  from  previous 
cognitions which  are less general, less dis-
tinet, and of  which we 11l1ve a less lively con-
sciousness.  rrhese in their turn lmve been 
derived from others still less general, less dis-
tinct, and less Vivid; and so on back to the 
ideal*  first,  which  is  quite  singular,  and 
quite out of consciousness.  ~'his ideal first is 
the  particular thing-in-itself. It  does not  exist 
as sue!..  That is, there is no thil1g which is 
in-itself in the sellSe of not being relative to 
the mind, though thi11gS  which are relative 
to the mind doubtless are,. apart from that 
relation.  rl'he  cognitions which thus reach 
us by this infinite series of inductions and 
hypotheses  (which  though infinite a  parte 
ante logice, is yet as  one continuous process 
not without a beginning in time)  are oft-wo 
kinds, tIle  true  and  the untrue, or cogni-
tions whose objects are Teal and those whose 
objects ure unreal.  And what do we mean 
by the re31'(  It is a  conception  which  we 
must first have. had  when  we  discovered 
that there was an unreal, an illusion; that 
is, when we fu'st corrected ourselves.  Now 
the distinction  for which alone this fact lo-
gically called, was between an ens relative 
to private inward determinations, to the ne-
gations belonging  to idiosyncrasy,  and an 
ens  sllch  as would stand in the long run. 
'1'he real, then, is that which, sooner or later, 
hlformation and reasoning would finally re-
sult in, and which  is thercfore independent 
of the vagaries oj me and you.  r.1'hus,  the 
very  origin  of tlle  conception  of  reality 
shows  that  this  conception  esseJ.ltially in-
volves the notion of a COM?lUNITY, with-
out definite limits, and capable of a definite 
increase of knowledge.  And so those two 
series of cognitions-the real and the un-
renl-consist of those ·which, at a time suf-
ficiently future, the community will always 
continue to  I'e-affirm;  and of those which, 
under the  same  conditions, ,,,,,ill  ever after 
be denied.  Now, a  proposition whose fals-
ity  can never  be discovered, and the error 
·of which therefore is absolutelyincognlzable, 
contains, upon  Ol.lr  principle, absolutely no 
error.  Consequently, that which is thongllt 
in these cognitions is the real, as it  really is. 
There.is nothing. then, to prevent o,u' know-
ing outward tllings as they really are, and it 
is most likely tl1ut we do thus know them. in 
nnmberless cases, although we can never be 
absolutely certain of doing so in any special 
case. 
But it follows  that since no cognition of 
ours is absolutely determinate, generals must 
have a  real  existence.  Now this SC110lastic 
realism is usually set down as a belief in met-
* By an ideal. I  mean  the limit Wllich  the 
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aphysical nctions.  But, in fact, a  realist is 
simply  one who knows 110 more recondite 
reality than that which is represented in a 
true  representation.  Sinc!3,  therefore, the 
word "man" is true of  something,  1;11 at which 
"man" 111.eans is real.  The nominalist must 
admit that man is truly applicable to some-
thing; but he believes that there is beneath 
this a thing in itself, an incognizable reality. 
His is the metaphysical  fig'mellt.  Uoc1ern 
nominalists are mostly superficial men, who 
do  not· kllnw,  as the more  thorough Hos-
ceUinns  and  Occam  did,  that  ~t  reality 
Wl1ich  l1fis  no  representation is  Ol1e  which 
. has no relation anc1110  qnality,  The great 
arg'tun~nt for nominalism is that there is 110 
man  unless  there  is  some. partieulur man. 
'I'hat, however, does not affect the realism of 
Scotns;  for  althoug'h  there  is  no  man of 
whorn all further determination can be de-
nieel, yet  there  is a  man, abstraction  beillg 
made of all furthcr deterrnination.  There is 
a real difference between man irrespective of 
what the other  c1etel'lninations may be, and 
man with  this  or  that particnlar series  of 
determinations,  although  undouhtedly  this 
difference is only relative to the  mind  and 
not in 9'e.  8nch is  the  position  of Scotns,* 
Occam's gren.t  objection is, there ean be no 
real  distinetion  which  is  not  in  9'C,  in the 
thing-in-itself;  but this llpgs  the  qucstion. 
for it is itself based only on the notioH that 
reality  is  somethi  ng  independent of repre-
sentative relation.  t 
Such being the nature of reality in gelle-
ral,  iIi  what docs the reality of the mind 
consist?  rVe have seen that the content of 
consciollsness, the entire phenomenal mnui-
festation  of mind, is n sign  l'esnlting  from 
inference.  Upon our principle,  therefore. 
that the  absolutely  ineugniznble  does not· 
exist, so tlmt the phenomennllllunifestatioll 
of a  !;ubshmce  is  the  substauee,  we must 
conclude that the mind is a sign  developillg 
according to the  la·ws of inference.  "What 
distinguishes a Illan from a worlI'?  'l'lIel'e is 
a distinction doubtless.  The lllaterial fJl1al-
ities, the forces  which  cOllRtitn!e  tlIG  pure 
denotative application, anll  the  Hlellllin'"  of 
'"  .* "Eadplll  nll.t~ll'a,est, qllm in ('xiHtentill. [)(Or 
grndlllll  stl1gulnl'!tatls  est  dL'te>r'lllillltta  pt  in 
intellectn, hoe est ut  hahet  l'elutiotH'IIl'acl  in  .. 
tellectuill  Ht  cog-nitlllll  ad  COJ.<rJOSi!1'1I8,  ('st  ill-
dcterminl1tn." - Qurost,  SniJtillisoillloo,  lrb.  7, 
qu, 18. 
t  See his argument  SUII/IIIU  lO!Jices,  part.  I, 
cnp.16. 
the human sign, are all exceedingI}r compli-
cated in eornpl11'isOll with those or the 'vonl. 
But  these  clift'crcllces  nrc  only  relative. 
vVhat other is therc?  It may  1)0  Rni<1  that 
man is conscious, while n won1 iii llOt.  nut 
consciollslleRs is  11 yery yngne term.  It  Hlay 
meun thnt emotion ,vhieh Hccolllpanies the 
reflcction  thut; we have  animal  life,  'l'his 
is 1t  conscionsncss which is  dimll1ell  whell 
animullife is at its ebb in olel  age, 0]' sleep, 
but.which is not dimmed when.the spiritual 
life is ni; its ebb; which is  the more lively 
Ule better animal a mall is, 1mt; which ifl not 
so, the better man he is. 'Ve do not at.tribute 
this  sensation to words,  beeUllSC  we  haye 
reason to believe that it  is dcpendent UpOll 
the possession of lUI. al1imalbody.  J~ut this 
eOllseiousimss,  heillg  a  mere sensation, is 
onl), a  part of the mail!'l'ial  quality of tile 
man-sign.  Again,  consciousness  .is  some-
times used to signify the I  think, 01' llnH.y ill 
thQught; but the unity is nothillg imt con-
sistency, or the recogui{;ion of it.  COllsist-
ellcy belongs to C\'el'), sign, so tllr as it;  is a 
sign; and therefore evetT sigll, since it Rig-
niiies primarily thnt it is It sigll, sigllines its 
OWJ1  consistency.  'l'he  UWJJ'sigll  !leqnires 
information, and co.mes to menn morc than 
he did before.  But so do won]".  DoeR IIi)!; 
eleetricity lUClIn mOl'e !lOW Uwn it; (lid in the 
days of l"l'nllklin i'  l.Ian  Tlmkes  the  word, 
llnd the WOl'i] lIleans llothing ,,,!tieh tllC llIllll 
hns not made it llIean, Hlld tlJat only to ROllle 
man.  nut  Hince  mall  ean  tIlillk  only hy 
means of wor<1R or other exterllul  R,Ylllhols, 
thc.~e lllight tU1'1l rOlllH] and say: "Yon  llleall 
notlling wltieh we have !lot tHug-ht ,rOll, nnd 
then ollly so fill' as YOll  luI(!t'm;s  SOlllC  word 
as the  illtel1Wetunt of your tlJought."  III 
fhet, there  tore, men aud words  rCeilllloenlly 
edllcllte caeh other; each hwrelll«J of  a mun's 
iuformation illvolYefl  allli  is irn·o]vll(l  hv  It  ,. , 
corresponding illerense of:t won!'s iulhrlUn-
tiOll. 
\yit:l!on!; fatiguing  the reader hy ,,[retell-
ing (:Ilis pat'allelislII too till', H is suillt:ient to 
sny that there  is  no  u\ellJCHt.  whatever of 
mUll's  eOlls(JiollRll(JSK  whidl  II1IK  HOI, SOlIlO-
llJing'  eOl'l'(JRjlOIHlill,!;  10 it: ill tho word;  aw1 
the reaSOll is ollyiol!H.  It  iH  thaI;  1  ho  W01'([ 
01' HigH whieh lllall llS(!H  i,'i  tho HHllI hilllsdf. 
1<'01',  as  t:he  fael:  thnt  nnw."  llHlIlghl.  is  :t 
f<ign,  taken ill ('Olljlllld.ioll willl Ow the!:  t.lll1t 
IIfu if:' It tmin of I hOllghl, jll'()\'OS thut IlHlll is 
a ;;ig;n;  "0, Ihal. (Ire!',}"  (hollght is au I:w!cnutl 
sign, provo",  (hat lIIani!-j an  extn!'lIul !"i--II. 
,." 
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sign are identical, in the SHme sense in which 
the worels homo and man arc identical. 'rhus 
my language is the sum total of rnyself; for 
the man is the thought. 
It  is hard for man to understand this, be-
cause he persists in identifying himself with 
his will, his power over the animal organ-
ism, with brute force.  Now the organism is 
only  ;111  instrument of thonght.  But the 
identity of a man consists in the con8i8tency 
of what he does and thinks, and consiste1'cy 
is the intelleetunl character of a thing; that 
is, is its expressing' something. 
Finally, as what; anything really is, is what 
it may fiually  come to be known to be in 
the ideal state of complete  infornmtiol1, so 
that; reality depends on the ultimate deeis-
ion of the com  mlll1ity; so thong'ht is what 
it is, only by virtue of its  addressing a  fu-
ture thOllght which is in its value as tllOUght 
identical with it,  though 11,01'e  developed. 
In this ,yay, the existence of thought now, 
clepends 011 what is to be hereafter;  so that 
it has only a potential existence, dependent 
on the futm'e thought of the community. 
The inrliviclual ml111, since his separn,te ex-
istence is manifested only by ignOl'!lllCe and 
error, so far as he is anything apart from his 
fellows, and ii'om what he and  they are to 
be, is only a negation.  'l'his is )11>111., 
*  *- *  " prelul ~nan 
ThIos!; ignorant of what he's most as~ured, 
lIis glassy essence." 
"-C-____________  "". __ 
AN  AL  YSIS OF HEGEL'S }ESTHETICS. 
['l'rl1nslMcd from  tho Frenoh of Charles  Denard by  JAB.  A, ltIARTLlNG.] 
IV. lYIusw.-Art represents, under differ-
ent forms, the development of spirit.  It is, 
accordingly, thc degree of spiriLuality in Lhe 
lllode of exprcsflion which a.ssigns to each of 
thc arts its ranl\:, its pre-eminence, and which 
Serves to fix its relu:tiollS. 
A1'chitedm'e is tIle most imperfect art, ex-
pressing  thought in it vague manner only, 
through  forms  borl'uwed  from  'i11m'gallic 
matter.  Next,  Sculpttwe  represents  spirit, . 
but still as identiiied with the body, and only 
so  far  as corporeal form  allows,  Painting 
expresses the innermost and profoundest side 
of the  sonl, passion, and  1no1'al  sentiment. 
HGIwe it rqjeets luattcr, in order tlmt it may 
confine it.."lelf to surfacc.  It employs visible 
appearallce  and  color  as  a  richer,  more 
varied and more  spiritmtl  mode  of expres-
sion.  Nevertheless this nppeal'fl.l1Ce is always 
borrowod fl'om the visible, ()xtendccl, and per-
n,ancnt form. 
Thcre is in the soul it necessity for signs, 
for  materials,  more in conformity with its 
nntm'e, presf,)llting Ilotl1ing fixed aBel extend-
ed, and where the rruiterial side 'wholly dis-
appears. 
'l'his need is suppliecl in Jtlusie.  Its end is 
to expres the soul in itself', the inner senti-
Incnt, by a sign which no longer offers any-
tIling extonclecl or material, by a sign invisi-
ble, rapid and fleeting as the" movements of 
soul.  itself.  '.fhis. sign, w11ieh  is, however, 
still  produced"  by HleflllS of matrer, no lT10re 
recnlls extension and its forms, but is sound, 
the result  of  the  undulatory  vibration  of 
bodies. 
As  music  abandons  visible forms, it ad-
dresses itself to a new organ, to the hearing, 
a sense more spiritunl, though less contem-
plative, than vjl:;ion.  '.rile  em' perceives this 
unextenc1ed sign, the resultant of that"vibra-
tion which leaves no trace after it, and van-
isheH in its exprcssion. 
By  thus  divesting  itself of external anel 
ma,tcrial form, sound is eminei,tly 1itted to 
be  the  echo of  the  soul and of sentiment. 
Aceordillgly, the problem of rnusic will be 
to awake the inmost chords of the soul, and 
to reproduce an its movements and en,otions. 
'l'heroby, 111so, its effects are explained, Its 
aim is to reach thc"utmost limit of sentiment; 
it is the art of sentiment.  Between art and 
sentirneut  there  exists  so intimate a union 
that they seemingly fuse together,  Sound, 
that immaterial phenom.enoll, without prop-
er duration, illstantm-lCons, borrowing all its 
value from tIm sentimcnt which it  veils, pen-
etrates into the soul and echoes through its 
depths. 
If we c01npllre music with the other arts, 
we  find, in the first  place, that it exhibits 
certain real annlogies ,"vitll  Anhitecim'e.  If 